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[Redacted]

PROD 2-SR ^{25X1}



DCI/ICS/87-7117
26 August 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM: DDR&E/ICS

SUBJECT: Answering Some Important Mail [Redacted]

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1. As promised, this package seeks your help. [Redacted]

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2. Attached is a copy of the package D/ICS received about answering some issues/concerns of Senator Helms. This material will require more than a few minutes to digest, but it is mostly self-explanatory. [Redacted]

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3. Beyond the homework, and irrespective of whether the assignment of coverage in Tab 3 is good or bad, we have some work to do. Listed below are the issues assigned to ICS at present, the issues' titles, and the XO's basic earlier assignments of each issue to an ICS creator/watchdog:

#	Name	ICS
14	Countermeasures to date: Soviet jamming of US National Technical means of reconnaissance.	DDR&E
17	Soviet knowledge of US National Technical means of intelligence collection and deceptive actions which the USSR might have taken on the basis of that knowledge.	DDR&E
18	The possibility of Soviet bloc sabotage being among the human errors causing the Space Shuttle Challenger and other recent US strategic space mission explosions.	PBO
21	Better means for protecting US Intelligence Sources and Methods and classified information, including reforming the classification system, so as to prevent such cases [Redacted]	CCISMO

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

25X1

SUBJECT: Answering Some Important Mail

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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4. Somehow, a major player in some of this--CIA's ACIS--got left out. I intend to try to get them involved directly. For example, ACIS should be in the lead on #26. [Redacted]

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5. In any case, I would propose that you use as many of the ideas in the attached correspondence as you are able. Further, you should send your inputs directly to the POC cited in Paragraph 10 [Redacted] Note the due date. [Redacted]

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6. If I may help, or answer questions, please call. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Attachment: a/s

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SUBJECT: Answering Some Important Mail




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Distribution: (DCI/ICS/87-7117)

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- DDR&E
- DDR&E Chrono
- ICS Registry

prod 2-SR

DCI/ICS



25 Aug 87



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NIC No. 03562-87
20 August 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM: Maj Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: The Helms Amendments

1. The attached OCA memorandum (Attachment 1) tasks the NIC to address issues cited by Senator Helms as intelligence problems which require competitive analysis. These issues are identified in a copy of Senator Helms' floor statement (Attachment 2) which was published on 24 September 1986. The NIC is required to respond to 24 of the 32 issues; the DDO and the Intelligence Community Staff have been tasked to respond to the eight remaining items.

2. Attachment 3 identifies a principal action office and one or more support offices for each of the 32 issues; NIOs are principals on 24 of these issues and are in support on 29 of them.

3. In addition to guidance provided in Attachment 1, participating NIOs should consider the following:

- Since there are few studies which can be considered true examples of competitive analysis, most input will focus on interagency work. For these interagency studies, identify any dissenting views by individual agencies which reflect independent analysis.
- Also address major finished intelligence produced by individual agencies or other sources with emphasis on specific studies which can be considered to represent competitive analysis of the issues in question.
- Cite only studies which are less than three years old, unless there are no recent examples. If this is the case indicate whatever we and others have done.

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4. To facilitate your efforts, please complete a questionnaire (Attachment 4) for each document which might relate to an issue, seeking out and incorporating inputs from all support offices. Support offices in turn are encouraged to contact action offices and provide contributions on any of the issues. As noted below action offices will also request inputs from other agencies to complete the project.

5. In this regard, in addition to the input for which ICS is responsible, has offered to provide input on several issues as indicated on Attachment 3. You can contact him (secure or to discuss ICS contributions.

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6. ADDI John Helgerson has also expressed an interest in this action and has offered DI support. In addition to any individual contacts you may have with DI offices to discuss this matter, at his request, a separate memo requesting input on each of our 24 issues will be provided to DI with a suspense of 28 August to allow you time to incorporate their views in your responses.

7. DIA has agreed to provide input on Defense Intelligence Estimates and other major DIA studies which address these issues. A copy of this memorandum has been provided to the Special Assistant for National Estimates, Directorate for Estimates.

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8. Contributions from other agencies should also be sought directly by NIOs from counterpart offices that may know of production relevant to the issues at hand.

9. Attached as Attachment 5 is a copy of our initial response to the amendment on competitive analysis which addresses competitive analysis in broad terms and responds to eight issues identified in the "SSCI Supplement to the Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the FY 1987 Intelligence Authorization Bill" (Attachment 6). Since there is considerable overlap between the issues in the supplement and the issues raised by Senator Helms, any comments you make on these issues should be consistent with views expressed in the initial response.

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10. Please provide the completed questionnaires to [redacted]
[redacted] (Room 7B07, [redacted]) by COB 1 September 1987.

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Frank B. Horton III

Attachments:

1. OCA Memo
2. Floor Statement
3. Action/Support Tasking
4. Questionnaire
5. Competitive Analysis
6. SSCI Supplement

cc: DDI
DDO
ICS

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NIC No. 03562-87
20 August 1987

SUBJECT: The Helms Amendments

NIC/AG/


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Distribution:

- 1 - C/NIC
- 1 - VC/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)
- 1 - NIO/AL/NP/CBW
- 1 - NIO/E
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- 1 - NIO/LA
- 1 - NIO/N
- 1 - NIO/S&T
- 1 - NIO/SP
- 1 - NIO/USSR



25X1

OCA 87-3422
13 August 1987

NOTE FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Dave Gries 
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: The Helms Amendments

Senator Helms' staff tells us that we did well with our response to the amendment on competitive analysis that was attached to the FY 87 Intelligence Authorization Bill. We did not, however, take into account the legislative history of the amendments and thus did not address the 32 components of the competitive analysis issue that were contained in Senator Helms' floor statement. We are required to address these issues prior to the Continuing Resolution or risk further legislative direction.

Attached is a copy of Senator Helms' floor statement indicating the 32 issues. We have marked those issues we believe can best be answered by your staff. We need a short unclassified response on each along with a longer classified annex if the latter is necessary. An acceptable response would be, "We have done two NIEs and one SNIE that address this issue. All intelligence agencies participated in the preparation of these documents and put forward the views of their agencies. The SNIE contained three dissenting footnotes." Then cite the SNIEs or NIEs. Alternatively, if no interagency work is available, it would be acceptable to cite finished intelligence produced by more individual agencies.

We require your responses by 4 September 1987 if we are to meet the Senator's deadline. Please contact  25X1 or  of my staff for guidance. Thank you for your 25X1 cooperation.

Attachment



25X1

September 24, 1986

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 1356

points to supplement the diligent work of the committee. This is in no way intended as a criticism of the work of the select committee, but merely to present an added perspective from a foreign policy point of view.

My first amendment amends the classified report of the select committee to provide some additional directions to the intelligence community on a number of topics, particularly with regard to intelligence about the Soviet Union. I will only single out for comment here a requirement for intensified competitive analysis. That may be a vague term to many because of the classified nature of the intelligence apparatus, but let me say for the record that it is enormously important.

□ 1500

Mr. President, competitive analysis has been demonstrated by the 1975 A team-B team exercise to be beneficial to better intelligence of our national security. Contending points of view and varying schools of analysis and interpretation are inevitable in the art form—I suppose one would call it—called intelligence. The classified supplement goes into more detail, but I have been assured by the distinguished chairman that the following list of intelligence problems will be studied under appropriate competitive analysis procedures:

1. Soviet geopolitical and strategic intentions, including the functions of the Soviet Five Year Defense Plan and the long range Fifteen Year Plan;
2. Soviet investigation of the feasibility of detecting submerged submarines through the analysis of data on the surface of the ocean;
3. The role of surprise and deception as principles of Soviet military doctrine;
4. Soviet perceptions of American military, political, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities;
5. The accuracy of Soviet intelligence;
6. The existence of hidden Soviet missiles for reload, refire, and covert soft launch, in strategic reserves;
7. The reasons for the continuing underestimation by CIA of Soviet strategic forces, in light of the recent statement in the White House Report to Congress on SALT II of June 16, 1986, that: "On the basis of the history of U.S. intelligence underestimation, it is unlikely that the numbers of Soviet strategic missiles, bombers, and warheads five years from now will be identical (or necessarily even close) to these [NIE] force projections";
8. The role of Soviet Bloc intelligence services in the international drug trade;
9. Better methodologies for estimating Soviet defense spending;
10. The effects of Soviet negotiating and operational deception in arms control;
11. Better methods for processing, debriefing, retaining, and resettling defectors and emigres;
12. Means of overcoming, deterring, and hardening against Soviet data denial through Soviet radio-electronic warfare;
13. The role of disinformation and forgeries in Soviet foreign policy; and the extent of Soviet Active Measures, disinformation and forgeries inside the United States;
14. Countermeasures to deter Soviet jamming of U.S. National Technical Means of

15. The extent of the Soviet lead over the U.S. in deploying a nationwide, land-based ABM defense, and in developing a space-based ABM defense, including identification of U.S. intelligence gaps on the Soviet SDI program;

16. Soviet civil defense capabilities;

17. Soviet knowledge of U.S. National Technical Means of intelligence collection, and deceptive actions which the USSR might have taken on the basis of that knowledge;

18. The possibility of Soviet Bloc sabotage being among the human errors causing the Space Shuttle Challenger and other recent U.S. strategic space mission explosions;

19. The Soviet Biological and Chemical Warfare threat, and potential U.S. countermeasures;

20. Implications for U.S. national security of Soviet military supremacy;

21. Better means for protecting U.S. Intelligence Sources and Methods and classified information, including reforming the classification system, so as to prevent such cases as the unlawful publication of details of the "Chalet" project by The New York Times in June, 1979;

22. Better methodologies for estimating yields of Soviet underground nuclear weapons tests, which utilize all the evidence available;

23. Possible limitations in U.S. area search and spot search reconnaissance capability, and the possibility of a U.S. search and spot National Technical Means of intelligence collection crisis due to the long-term stand-down in the U.S. Space Shuttle and other strategic space launch programs;

24. The possibility that the CIA and the State Department have been penetrated by the KGB at various levels;

25. The contents of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement prohibiting Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, and the evidence supporting the charges of President Reagan, the DCI, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy that Soviet Mig-27 fighter-bombers, TU-95 Bear bombers, strategic submarines, and the Soviet Combat Brigade in Cuba violate the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement;

26. The ability of U.S. National Technical Means of intelligence collection to monitor Soviet compliance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in space, and with an Anti-Satellite Treaty;

27. The history of Soviet violations of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, and whether the CIA blocked the creation of an Interagency Group to study these violations when first detected in 1976 and 1977;

28. The military implications of Soviet SALT and other arms control violations, and the reasons why the CIA resisted evidence and analysis showing Soviet SALT violations for 12 years;

29. Complete analysis of the Popov, Penkovsky, Goltzov, Nosenko, and Paepe cases, including their contribution to Intelligence Community analyses and Counter-Intelligence;

30. Long-term Soviet violations of the 1947 Rio Treaty, through their massive arms shipments to Cuba and to Nicaragua;

31. Allegations of drug trafficking, money laundering, arms trafficking, human rights violations, political assassination, and intelligence exchange and collaboration with Castro and Ortega by military leaders of Panama;

32. Reasons for reported CIA long term underestimation of Soviet submarine capabilities.

Mr. President, this amendment is

through the cooperation of a number of people, including the distinguished chairman of the committee and vice chairman and their very capable and competent staff.

I urge adoption of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DANFORTH). The Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, as my colleague has indicated we have put some effort in the last week or so against the concerns of the Senator from North Carolina.

Let me begin my brief comments in reaction to his amendment by indicating that I appreciate his comments on the intelligence bill itself. Like his members of the Select Committee on Intelligence are dedicated to improving the quality of intelligence available to the U.S. Government.

I have consulted with the members of the Intelligence Committee and can say that the committee has no objection to inclusion in its classified report on the bill the material of interest to the Senator from North Carolina.

The amendment which the Senator has offered to the bill reflects certain changes in the nature of a supplement, which would be incorporated into the committee's classified report on intelligence programs. Material in the supplement relates to the subject listed in the amendment and it is available to be read by any Member of the Senate who so wishes.

Mr. President, in view of the agreement of the committee for the inclusion of supplementary material in its classified report, members of the committee will not object to a motion by the Senator from North Carolina that his amendment be adopted. However, prior to proceeding with that motion I would like to engage in two colloquies with the Senator on the subjects of CIA analysts and on the subject of counter intelligence.

After hearing of the Senator's concerns in these areas it appeared for a variety of reasons more desirable to discuss them here than to include them in the classified report on the bill.

With respect to the issue of how CIA analysts use their time on basic research as proposed by the Senator on current reporting and policy support tasks such as briefing, I felt that a discussion on the floor would be sufficient to alert the Director of Central Intelligence to the Senate's interest in this issue.

I think we have agreed on a colloquy. If the Senator wants to proceed he certainly may do so.

Mr. HELMS. Very well.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman. I do have some questions which I wish to direct to the distinguished chairman concerning the kind of responsibilities that the

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Issue numbers are keyed to Senator Helms' floor statement of 24 September 1986.

ISSUE NO.	ACTION	SUPPORT *
1	USSR	SP, GPF, ECON
2	GPF	SP, S&T
3	USSR	SP, GPF, FDIA
4	FDIA	USSR, SP, GPF
5	SP	S&T
6	SP	FDIA
7	SP	
8	NARC	FDIA
9	ECON	USSR, S&T, SP, GPF
10	SP	ICS, USSR, FDIA
11	DDO	FDIA
12	GPF	ICS, FDIA, SP
13	FDIA	USSR, SP
14	ICS	SP
15	SP	S&T
16	SP	USSR, GPF
17	ICS	SP, FDIA
18	ICS	FDIA
19	CBW	
20	USSR	SP, GPF, FDIA
21	ICS	FDIA
22	NP	ICS, SP
23	ICS	SP
24	DDO	FDIA
25	LA	SP, GPF, USSR
26	ICS	SP, FDIA
27	CBW	ICS, GPF
28	SP	ICS
29	FDIA	DDO
30	LA	ICS, USSR, GPF
31	LA	NARC
32	GPF	SP, SRP Study on Alfa-Class Sub

* DDI, DIA, and other agency elements will provide support on most of these issues.

SUBJECT: Helms Amendment

ISSUE NUMBER (Keyed to Senator Helms' floor statement):

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SUBJECT: Helms Amendments

ISSUE NUMBER (Keyed to Senator Helms' floor statement):

ACTION OFFICE:

OFFICE(S) PROVIDING INPUT:

TYPE OF DOCUMENT (NIE, SNIE, IIM, IIA, MH, DDI, DIA, INR, Other):

DOCUMENT NUMBER:

TITLE:

DATE:

CLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENT:

FOR INTERAGENCY PRODUCTS, IDENTIFY AGENCIES WHICH PROVIDED ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OR FOOTNOTES ON THE ISSUE. FOR INDIVIDUAL AGENCY PRODUCTS, BRIEFLY STATE HOW IT DIFFERS FROM INTERAGENCY OR OTHER PRODUCTS ON THE ISSUE:


COMMENTS ON HOW THE DOCUMENT RELATES TO THE ISSUE AND, AS APPROPRIATE, HOW IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AN EXAMPLE OF COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS ON THE ISSUE:

OTHER COMMENTS:

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Central Intelligence Agency

COMINT 87-889



Orig: [redacted] 25X1
COMINT Subject
AnG Subject
AnG Chrono

Comptroller
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

8 July 1987

[redacted]

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Deputy Director for Requirements
and Evaluation,
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, D.C. 20505

[redacted]

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Attached is our revision of the report on competitive analysis requested in the Helms Amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1987; and your draft transmittal memo, with NIC revisions highlighted in yellow. [redacted]

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As [redacted] discussed with you, please include a sentence in the transmittal memo to make clear to all readers that we do not intend to produce a single, integrated unclassified assessment of the Soviet Union in the near future. [redacted]

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The DDCI and NIC would like a copy of the whole package, once it has been signed out. [redacted]

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Daniel A. Childs, Jr.

[redacted]

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COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In the Supplement to the Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the FY 1987 Intelligence Authorization Bill, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requests a report indicating how the Intelligence Community plans to incorporate competitive analysis in its assessments of various named issues. This memorandum responds to that request. It contains contributions from the National Security Agency, the Bureau for Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Intelligence Council. (S NF)

Overview

Intelligence analysis is a painstaking process of amassing and sorting a steadily increasing volume of partial information, some of it contradictory. Interpretations, past history, even guesses, are often part of the analytical process; only on extremely rare occasions are all the facts clear and the conclusions obvious. Because of the very human, and thus imperfect, nature of intelligence analysis, the Intelligence Community has developed a structure of internal and external checks and balances to ensure that all points of view on key intelligence questions, including competing points of view, are raised and fully considered. If a single judgment is inappropriate or cannot be reached without reducing clarity or sharpness of the analysis, we make clear to the policymaker where and why. Moreover, even when a consensus is possible, we increasingly try to indicate to the policymaker the strength of our evidence and our conclusions. We also try to provide a range of plausible alternative outcomes and assess the likelihood of each.

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The diverse, competitive analytical environment we seek is achieved in various ways:

- Organization structures and responsibilities are defined to guarantee that issues are looked at by more than one group, both on an agency and interagency basis.
- The National Intelligence Council's Community coordination process encourages diversity and dissent.
- Advisory panels comprised of outside experts as well as individual outside specialists review agency and interagency products.
- The increase in external research funds in recent years has allowed us to seek more aggressively independent viewpoints to challenge our internal assumptions and judgments.

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The structure of the Intelligence Community--and the agencies that comprise it--is designed to foster diversity of opinion and competitive analysis. These organizations have different responsibilities and interests. The formal mechanisms by which both agreement and diversity of views are reflected are National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), and Interagency Intelligence Memorandums (IIMs). Over the past years the DCI and the DDCI have taken steps to ensure that these Community documents represent all views and have demanded the use of alternate texts on contentious issues so that these documents may fairly represent to the policymakers those areas on which the members of the Community are divided.

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The National Intelligence Council (NIC), the DCI's interagency advisory group on substantive matters, is responsible for, among other things, identifying, managing, and producing NIEs and IIMs. The NIC is composed of senior intelligence officers from the various agencies of the Community and also includes experts from outside the Community. The appropriate National Intelligence Officer (NIO) managing an estimate will most often use a drafter from outside the NIC and from one of the agencies of the Intelligence Community. The annual estimate of Warsaw Pact forces pertinent to MBFR negotiations, for example, is prepared alternately by DIA and CIA. When DIA prepares the paper, it is vetted by CIA, and vice versa. The views contained in the drafts are often hotly contested, sometimes by the drafter's own agency. Another example of how the process ensures that competing views will be heard and explicitly represented is a recent amendment to an estimate of the Soviet Navy's submarine program. CIA, DIA, and the Navy differed sharply on their interpretations of the data, and all points of view were either reconciled or presented as alternative views in footnotes to the estimate. The final draft--as is the case for all estimates--was then discussed and coordinated by representatives of the agencies and approved by the NFIB.

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Organization structures within individual agencies also often encourage competitive analysis through diversity of responsibility and opinion. Within the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI), for example, the Office of Soviet Analysis generally takes the lead on Soviet questions, but the Offices of Scientific and Weapons Research, Global Issues, Imagery Analysis, and Leadership Analysis all play important roles in analyzing the entire spectrum of Soviet activities. Moreover, the other regional offices in the Directorate have their own perspectives regarding Soviet policies and activities relating to their parts of the world. Other agencies address issues in a similar multidimensional way. DIA, as another example, has a similar program to ensure competitive analysis is generated within its Agency. Intelligence questions regarding the Soviet Union are viewed from the perspective of general intelligence analyst, estimators, imagery analysts, S&T analysts (all within separate offices within one directorate), as well as with current intelligence analysts in a separate DIA directorate and with DIA's Defense Intelligence Officers, who report solely to the DIA Director. Such intra-DIA coordination and review are used to ensure that diverse opinions can be evaluated on important Soviet questions.

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SECRET [REDACTED]

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The DCI also maintains a number of advisory panels composed of outside experts and consultants who review and critique analytical research and provide guidance on future analysis. Such panels include the Senior Review Panel (SRP), the Military Economic Advisory Panel (MEAP), the Military Advisory Panel (MAP), the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP), and the Nuclear Intelligence Panel (NIP). Further diversity arises because the NIOs have a wide range of individual outside experts and consultants who review analytic research and provide advice in their specialized areas of expertise. [REDACTED]

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Within the CIA's DI, outside consultants are increasingly used to review DI Intelligence Assessments, and DI Offices in recent years have been strongly encouraged to broaden their analytic experience by attending or sponsoring conferences. In FY 1986 the Directorate conducted or participated in 203 conferences on Soviet issues that included outside specialists of all persuasions and viewpoints. A large number of papers were critically reviewed by outside experts. More formally, the Directorate routinely and frequently turns to outside consultants to obtain viewpoints that often challenge the assumptions and judgments developed internally. In FY 1986, the DI approved 469 contracts with 142 contractors on Soviet issues, from strategic weapons to economic developments and societal problems. In FY 1987, the DI has thus far some 314 contracts with 74 contractors on the books. Many of these contracts were let with the clear expectation that the conclusions would run counter to our judgments. Of the total contracts for external analysis on the Soviet Union currently on the books, we judge that 10 percent of them could be defined as "competitive"--that is, containing alternative explanations or pointing out areas of disagreement with CIA or Intelligence Community views. [REDACTED]

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Other Intelligence Community members have programs similar in purpose to CIA's. DIA, for example, has a special project, the Defense Academic Research Support Program, which brings outside academic experts into the Agency for roundtable discussions on key issues, not just on the Soviet Union, but on other important intelligence matters worldwide. This program also includes the preparation of special "think pieces" by such outside experts. This program is open not just to DIA personnel, but to other members of the Intelligence Community as well. DIA also has a unique relationship with five DoD/Service technical intelligence centers, and this relationship provides for independent analyses for non-Washington agencies on important technical intelligence developments for review and input to defense and national estimates. [REDACTED]

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Many of the Community agencies have created and maintained an independent capability to examine intelligence gained through national technical means that encourages competitive analysis. For example, imagery analysts from NPIC and from CIA's and DIA's imagery interpretation offices provide for a range of opinions on the significance of observed foreign activities. [REDACTED]

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Community efforts to ensure analytical diversity are amplified below, numbered according to the Supplement to the Senate Intelligence Committee Report. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Geopolitical Intentions

The Intelligence Community analyzes Soviet geopolitical intentions with the aid not only of its extensive human and technical collection network but also, because of the inherently "soft" nature of evidence bearing on Soviet geopolitical intentions, by means of intellectual debate and assessment of alternative hypotheses and explanations for Soviet geopolitical behavior. This process frequently involves soliciting support from experts outside the Intelligence Community as well as exploiting the mechanisms of competitive analysis within the Intelligence Community. [redacted]

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Competitive analysis is also promoted through DIA's Defense Intelligence College. The College provides a wide range of instruction on both substantive issues and analytical methodology and sponsors numerous conferences, symposia, and discussions at which recognized experts discuss their views on key substantive issues. Such activities stimulate intense discussion among intelligence analysts from throughout the Community. [redacted]

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Support from outside the Intelligence Community includes contracts with scholars of various persuasions for analysis on, for example, Soviet involvement in key geostrategic regions such as Central America, southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa. Members of the Intelligence Community also exchange views with cooperating foreign intelligence services and knowledgeable academics and closely monitor press and journal analyses with their varying interpretations of events. Additionally, agencies of the Intelligence Community have various programs to permit their personnel to visit key countries and regions to assess developments firsthand, which is particularly useful in those countries in which the Soviets are seeking to extend their influence. [redacted]

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Soviet Strategic Defense Programs

The interagency process in assessing Soviet strategic defenses was especially active over the past 12 months. In addition to publishing NIE 11-3/8, a general review of Soviet strategic forces, the Community also published IIMs specifically addressing the Soviet air defense and civil defense efforts. A new NIE on Soviet ballistic missile defense efforts will be published later this year. The drafting team for this large and comprehensive estimate is composed of analysts from three members of the Community, thus ensuring a full airing of divergent views. The Intelligence Community also has embarked on an IIM, The Soviet Deep Underground Facility Program, that will provide an all-source look at a key Soviet leadership protection program. DIA has taken the lead in drafting this paper, providing its unique insight and analysis. Moreover, the second edition of the IIM, Soviet Military Production, now approaching publication, will provide improved and expanded intelligence of the production and procurement of materiel in support not only of Soviet strategic defense, but strategic offensive and general purpose forces as well. [redacted]

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The crucial importance of Soviet strategic defense has led the Community to look outside to ensure rigorous and accurate analysis. Typically, the use of outside consultants takes the form of contracts for independent analysis, such as a recently completed study by an outside contractor of the ABM potential of Soviet SA-12 surface-to-air missile systems. The analysis was specifically designed to take an alternative view of an issue on which we had already come to some conclusions. Another effort is a contract looking at Soviet approaches to SDI architectures. [REDACTED]

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A year-long study by two CIA/DI analysts to assess the Soviet capability to break out of the ABM Treaty by rapidly deploying a nationwide ABM defense involved:

- Research of nonintelligence sources such as books on the topic by experts outside the US Government.
- Engagement of separate outside contractors to look at Soviet ABM interceptor performance and ABM deployment possibilities, ABM radar production and costing, and ABM deployment alternatives.
- Inputs from the Department of Energy to help cost nuclear material production for ABM warheads.
- Consultations with academic authorities and with retired US personnel who once worked on the US ABM program.
- Discussions on preliminary results with analysts from DIA, SAC, and NSA, [REDACTED]

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Similarly, DIA continues active research into the Soviet ABM program, exploring alternative explanations to Soviet ABM activities. The "breakout" issue and ABM potential of strategic SAMs have received particular attention by DIA, its contractors, and the technical intelligence centers of the Services. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Strategic Capabilities

Each agency of the Intelligence Community employs a rigorous internal process to analyze Soviet strategic capabilities. Moreover, on vital intelligence issues such as this, the interagency coordinating process is equally rigorous because analysts in different agencies often arrive at different conclusions. For example, interpretations concerning such issues as the number of RVs carried by Soviet ICBMs, or the capability of the Soviets to reconstitute their forces following an initial nuclear exchange, diverge within the Intelligence Community. Interagency working groups have been established to foster analyst discussions of their differing estimates and, where possible, to forge a consensus. The National Intelligence Officer responsible for the substantive issue in question initiates actions to produce interagency papers, including the annual NIE on Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict (NIE 11-3/8), and reports the differing views and supporting analysis to policymakers for their consideration. Recent contractor studies include a study on Soviet capabilities to store and deploy mobile missiles covertly; the performance characteristics of the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25; the potential use of the SA-X-12 in an ABM role; Soviet views of ballistic missile effectiveness; and compendiums/reference studies of individuals and institutions associated with Soviet strategic planning.

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

The DCI sponsors a series of technical committees--Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC), Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC), and the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC). These committees have representation from throughout the Intelligence Community and provide a forum for consideration of independent technical analyses. The chairmanship of these committees rotates among Community agencies, with DIA having recently chaired WSSIC and currently chairing JAEIC for example. [REDACTED]

25X1

Soviet Involvement in Drug Trafficking

Two interagency papers were recently completed under the auspices of the NIO/Narcotics: an IIM on Cuban Government Involvement in Drug Trafficking and an NIE on The International Drug Trade: Implications for US Security. Studies of this kind exemplify best our involvement in the competitive analysis process within the Community on the issue of Soviet client state involvement in drug trafficking. CIA, DIA, and the DEA all made comprehensive contributions to these studies, and when disagreements appeared the various views were presented. Similarly, a recent DI research paper, The USSR and Illicit Drugs: Facing Up to the Problem, drew heavily from information provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and our analysts solicited the views of DEA intelligence analysts on the key findings of the paper. The CIA/DI's current and finished intelligence on the role of the Soviet Union in the drug trade and the involvement of clients such as Cuba and Nicaragua incorporates analytical judgments from throughout the Community as well as those of law enforcement agencies. [REDACTED]

25X1

Soviet Compliance with Arms Control and Other Treaties

The Intelligence Community works closely with the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Energy in assessing Soviet compliance behavior and contributing to US policy deliberations on how to respond to evidence of Soviet noncompliance with US-Soviet understandings. The Intelligence Community likewise is a direct, if not a leading, participant in the interagency process of drafting and analysis related to the annual production of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. [REDACTED]

25X1

Within the Intelligence Community, annual interagency monitoring and compliance studies are produced on Soviet activities relating to strategic arms and the ABM Treaty, and a consolidated annual report covers chemical and biological weapons agreements (The Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention), the Outer Space Treaty, nuclear testing and proliferation, and Soviet practices with respect to concealment, interference, and data denial. Projection of future Soviet strategic forces for cases that assume the presence or absence of arms control accords are also considered and analyzed at the interagency level in such documents as the annual estimate on Soviet strategic forces (NIE 11-3/8). As in all interagency studies, where differences--such as between CIA and DIA--have occurred, there are full expositions of the assumptions and methodologies that underpin the divergent interpretations. [REDACTED]

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SECRET

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Numerous studies from experts and organizations outside the Intelligence Community are commissioned as an integral part of the process of developing Community judgments on these issues. One recent study attempted to look at space arms agreements from the Soviet point of view, hypothesized Soviet cheating scenarios, and analyzed US ability to detect such cheating. The study provided a valuable independent look at an issue on which the Community had already formed some preliminary judgments. Another DI contractor has conducted a systems analysis of the underground testing problem and has reviewed methods for estimating the yields of underground tests. These results will be used in assessing Soviet compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. And other contractors examined the question of why the Soviets cheat on arms control accords. DIA has a similar program to examine important aspects of the Soviet underground testing program, which enhances the Intelligence Community's range of explanations regarding this important subject. Alternative views on yield assessment have been developed.

25X1

An Assessment of Soviet Negotiating Behavior in, and Compliance with, the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement Ending the Cuban Missile Crisis

No single document records a US-Soviet "agreement" on the permissible limits of Soviet military activity in Cuba. The historical record consists of a series of messages, statements, and bilateral conversations in which the US has sought to define the limits of Soviet activity in Cuba. These limits include the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, the introduction of offensive weapon systems, and Soviet/Cuban support of subversion in other areas of the Western Hemisphere. The Intelligence Community has devoted considerable effort to monitoring Soviet relations with Cuba, including the status of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the introduction of MIG-23s into Cuba, and Soviet/Cuban links with various insurgent and terrorist groups throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Community also has paid increasing attention to the Sandinista role as a Soviet/Cuban surrogate in Latin America.

25X1

Soviet ASW Capabilities

Our analysis of Soviet antisubmarine warfare looks at both traditional (acoustic) and nonacoustic ASW issues. In the latter area, the Intelligence Community has undertaken an independent study (under CIA leadership) in response to policymaker and Congressional concerns. The study will evaluate the future Soviet nonacoustic threat to US strategic submarines and will produce a threat assessment that fully accounts for:

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CONF 86-2697

17 DEC 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Administrative Officer, DCI Area

FROM: Daniel A. Childs, Jr.
Comptroller

SUBJECT: SSCI Classified Annex Supplement to FY 1987
Intelligence Authorization Bill

Bill:-

1. This memorandum transmits a Supplement to the SSCI Classified Annex to the FY 1987 Intelligence Authorization Bill. The Supplement--largely put together by Senator Helms (R, NC)--contains comments about Agency operations and procedures, sense of the Senate recommendations, and requests for specific Agency or Community studies. [redacted] 25X1

2. Attachment A is the SSCI Classified Annex Supplement. The Intelligence Community Staff has issued general tasking for responding to this congressional request; attachment B lists the Agency's specific taskings, with due dates. Although the ICS memorandum asks for a report on integrated estimates of the Soviet Union (item 5), we do not believe that a written Agency response is necessary. The NIC should seek DCI/DDCI guidance before responding. [redacted] 25X1

3. Please forward the requested reports to the Office of the Comptroller by the due date indicated. The report on training in combatting Marxism-Leninism has already been received and is listed for information only. [redacted] 25X1

4. Please contact me if my staff can be of assistance. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]
Daniel A. Childs, Jr.

Attachments:

- A. Supplement to SSCI Classified Annex to FY 1987 Intelligence Authorization Bill
- B. Congressionally Directed Actions

cc: D/OCA

[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1
25X1

Attachment A

**SUPPLEMENT TO SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
ON FY 1987 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION BILL**

The classified supplement to the Intelligence Authorization for FY 1987 as reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence is supplemented by the following guidance:

I. COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS

It is the sense of the Senate that competitive analysis incorporating a range of viewpoints is essential to intelligence. The "A Team - B Team" exercise initiated in 1975 was exemplary of the benefits that such competitive analysis can achieve, inasmuch as it developed alternative explanations to intelligence issues and identified the questions the Intelligence Community needed to address in order to resolve these issues. Competitive analysis is and should continue to be a part of the DCI's program in the future.

The DCI is requested to provide by May 1, 1987, to the Intelligence Committees of Congress a report indicating how the Intelligence Community plans to incorporate competitive analysis in the uses of competitive analysis in its assessments of the following issues:

1. Soviet Geopolitical Intentions, including the functions of the 5-year and 15-year Soviet Defense Plans; the effects of Soviet perceptions of U.S. military, political, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities; and, the implications to U.S. national security of Soviet military superiority.
2. Soviet Strategic Defense Programs, including Soviet civil defense capabilities; Soviet prospects for deploying a nationwide, landbased ABM system; and, Soviet prospects for deploying a space-based ABM system.
3. Soviet Concealment, Denial, and Deception Activities, including the role of surprise and deception in Soviet military doctrine; the effects of Soviet negotiation and operational deception in arms control; the role of disinformation and forgeries in Soviet foreign policy and Active Measures within the United States; and, Soviet measures to counter U.S. National Technical Means of monitoring arms control.
4. Soviet Strategic Capabilities, including the accuracy of Soviet missiles; the existence of Soviet reserve missile for reloading and refiring operations; and, Soviet biological and chemical warfare capabilities (and other non-nuclear "weapons of mass destruction").
5. Soviet Involvement in Drug Trafficking, including the role of Soviet intelligence laundering of drug money by the Soviet Union; and, the role of Soviet clients such as Cuba and Nicaragua in the drug trade.

6. Soviet Compliance with Arms Control and Other Treaties, including the Biological and Weapons Conventions, the 1947 Rio Treaty, and, all Soviet-American strategic arms treaties, with an assessment of the military implications of these violations.

7. An Assessment of Soviet Negotiating Behavior in, and Compliance to, the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement Ending the Cuban Missile Crisis, and

8. Soviet ASW Capabilities, including the use of space-based or airborne radar systems for the detection of wakes.

II. SURVIVABILITY OF TECHNICAL COLLECTION

The Congress is concerned that current pressures on the National Intelligence and Department of Defense budgets are causing a scaling back of efforts designed to provide survivable intelligence collection. Given the importance of addressing gaps in providing assured survivable intelligence collection to support National Command Authorities during nuclear war, the DCI and Secretary of Defense are requested to report to the Intelligence Committees the specific upgrades to existing or planned capabilities, or specific new systems needed to provide intelligence collection responsive to identified requirements.

This review should take into account the requirements for targeting of strategic relocatable targets, vulnerabilities of current fixed technical collection facilities, the timeliness with which survivable collection must be processed and disseminated to intelligence consumers, and the need to expand research and development in promising new technical approaches to survivability, to include, but not be limited to, certain clandestine means of acquiring the necessary collection. This review should also fully take into account any requirement identified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff associated with the detection and targeting of underground facilities.

III. PROVISION OF THE 1980 TRANSITION REPORT TO CONGRESS

The Senate requests the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the 1980 Reagan Administration Transition Team Report on the CIA to the Intelligence Committees of Congress along with the CIA's current comments about this report.

IV. TRAINING ON COMBATTING MARXISM-LENINISM

The DCI is requested to report to the Intelligence Committees of the Congress no later than January 3, 1987, the training which is currently being provided or is planned for CIA employees in combating Marxist-Leninist ideology; alternatives for reestablishing or strengthening training in this area; and, the feasibility of expanding such training to Department of State employees departing on foreign assignment.