

~~TOP SECRET~~

EID

[Redacted]

22 September 1955

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

Copy No. 99

25X1

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

DOCUMENT NO. 18  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 15 JAN 1980 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

**Office of Current Intelligence**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

[Redacted]

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

**Page Denied**

**CONTENTS**

**1. COMMENT ON ARGENTINE SITUATION (page 3).**



25X1


**3. COMMENT ON VIET MINH CABINET CHANGES (page 5).**

\* \* \* \*

**THE FORMOSA STRAITS**  
(page 6)

25X1

1. COMMENT ON ARGENTINE SITUATION



The new governing junta established as a result of truce negotiations between the victorious forces of the Argentine revolution and the military junta of the "loyalist forces" consists of professional military leaders, none of whom is known to be unfriendly to the United States.

25X1


Retired army general Eduardo Lonardi has been announced as the head of the new junta, which will also include Admiral Rojas and Generals Bengoa and Bergallo. Lonardi, who has a reputation for integrity, was implicated in the unsuccessful September 1951 revolt. Admiral Rojas commanded the rebel fleet during the current revolt. General Bengoa, who is widely respected throughout the army, was reported in the early stages of the June 1955 revolt to be the rebel commander but later claimed to be on Peron's side. He resigned from the service in August. General Bergallo is believed not to have been engaged in any political activities.

The new junta will be plagued both by interservice rivalries and by the ever-present danger of serious strikes and possible sabotage by the General Confederation of Labor and those members of the Peronista party who remain fanatically loyal to Peron.

25X1

**Page Denied**

### 3. COMMENT ON VIET MINH CABINET CHANGES



President Ho Chi Minh's relinquishment of the premiership to Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong, together with appointment of Vo Nguyen Giap and Phan Ke Toai as vice premiers, formalizes an already existing arrangement. Pham Van Dong has been closely associated with daily direction of government affairs. There is no indication that these changes result from factional struggles or policy differences.

25X1

Ho's position now more closely resembles that of Mao Tse-tung in Peiping. Ho remains president of the state and chairman of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party.

The announcement was made before a session of the National Assembly hastily called to approve the government's policies and its campaign for unification of all Vietnam. Ho's new position allows him to stand above and apart from the government and thus may enhance his value as a popular symbol in South Vietnam as well as in the north.

25X1



25X1

**BIWEEKLY SUMMARY  
(8-21 September 1955)**

**THE FORMOSA STRAITS**

[Redacted]

25X1

1. Military activity in the area remained at a low level during the period. Small-scale artillery exchanges occurred intermittently. [Redacted]

25X1

2. Chief, MAAG (Formosa), reported on 18 September that President Chiang Kai-shek has ordered an additional artillery battalion and another infantry battalion to reinforce the Matsu garrison. The apparent basis for this is Chiang's expectation of a Communist attack against Matsu sometime between 27 September and 15 October. Chief, MAAG, has protested and has reiterated his position that no more troops should be sent to the offshore islands. Of the 21 infantry divisions in the Nationalist army, 7 1/3 currently are on the offshore islands and chief, MAAG, considers that this is already a larger force than can be adequately supported.

The Nationalists will probably proceed with this reinforcement, however, just as they did with the recent movement of a division to Quemoy over strenuous MAAG objections. The claim of an impending attack against Matsu is not confirmed by any other sources and is probably a fabrication to justify this reinforcement. It may be that Chiang believes that by committing an excessively large portion of his regular forces to the offshore islands, the US will be compelled to support him in the event of a Communist attack.

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

**4. Peiping's tactics evidence a continuing determination to get the US to negotiate with Communist China on the questions now dividing the two countries. Peiping's propaganda and Wang Ping-nan's statements to Ambassador Johnson have hinted that the repatriation agreement would be jeopardized if the Americans refused to get on with the second phase of the Geneva talks.** [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

**Page Denied**